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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reviews the particular characteristics of rail investment projects, taking 
as a starting point four examples ranging from decisions on individual routes to 
national rail investment programmes.  The motivation for rail investment, and the 
interdependence of projects are examined, before turning to the identification of 
base case and options and the measurement of costs and benefits.  It is argued that 
the main problems in rail investment appraisal are not technical ones relating to 
measuring costs and benefits but are contextual ones relating to the 
interdependence between rail projects and with decisions in other sectors of the 
economy.  For this reason it is essential that rail projects be appraised with an 
appropriate planning framework. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rail sector has some important differences from the rest of the transport sector: 
 
a.It is usually run as an integrated organisation covering infrastructure and 
operations, although recent proposals by the Economic Commission suggest 
a separation of these two activities (this has already happened in Sweden 
and is proposed as part of the privatisation of British Rail - see Nash and 
Preston, 1992). 
 
b.It is typically a curious mix of commercial and social, with some activities 
(usually long distance passenger and freight services) operated on a 
commercial basis, and others (suburban and local passenger services) 
subsidised.  Needless to say, this complicates the appraisal of investments 
which benefit both types of service. 
 
c.It is a multiproduct organisation and production of the various products interacts 
to a much greater extent than in road transport.  For instance a bus 
company can schedule its individual services largely independently, without 
worrying whether the infrastructure can accommodate them.  For rail 
services, track capacity has to be allocated; therefore all the services 
operated by a rail operator are interdependent to the extent that they share 
the same infrastructure. 
 
All of these factors lead to the rail sector having its own particular problems when 
it comes to project appraisal.  The first makes it difficult to define an individual 
project; any investment in infrastructure is liable to have direct implications for the 
rolling stock and vice versa.  The second means that we typically have a mixture of 
financial appraisal, financial appraisal subject to political constraints as to what is 
feasible and social cost-benefit analysis.  Also broader considerations of transport 
and land use planning may need to be taken into account.  The third means that 
appraisals typically have to consider the future of a whole range of services rather 
than a single one in isolation. 
 
In what follows we shall first describe briefly a set of four case studies, ranging 
from modernisation of a relatively minor part of the London commuter network to 
investment planning for the entire Australian main line rail system.  These case 
studies will be used to illustrate the points made in the rest of the paper.  Then we 
shall consider the various motivations for investment in rail transport and the way 
in which projects are generated.  We then discuss the problems the characteristics 
of rail transport lead to in defining first the base case and then the options to be 
considered.  We shall discuss the important issue of interactions between 
investments, and consider particular problems which arise in valuing costs and 
benefits.  Finally, we reach our conclusions on the issues that arise in determining 
an appropriate methodology for rail project appraisal. 
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2. CASE STUDIES 
 
a. `Networker' trains for Kent 
 
The rail network in Kent serves a set of communities ranging from the boundary of 
Greater London to the coast some 80 miles away.  From this area a total of some 
140,000 people commute daily into central London (British Railways Board, 1991a, 
page 14).  The services in Kent form part of the Network Southeast sector of British 
Rail.  This has an obligation placed on it by the government under the 1974 
Railways Act to provide a service `broadly comparable to that which existed in 
1974' and to achieve certain quality standards concerning reliability and crowding. 
 It is provided with a subsidy, although this has been reduced through the 1980's, 
and there is a heavy emphasis on improving financial performance. 
 
Most of the infrastructure and rolling stock used for these services is elderly, the 
rolling stock being largely between 30 and 40 years old, and is becoming unreliable 
and expensive to maintain.  In the 1980's, contrary to previous forecasts, traffic on 
the system rose substantially, placing a further strain on rolling stock and track 
capacity.  At the same time, opening of the Channel Tunnel would place a further 
strain on the capacity of these routes by requiring them to accommodate some 28 
high speed passenger trains and 35 freight trains per day between Britain and the 
continent. 
 
The solution to these problems was seen to be in investment in a new generation of 
high capacity high performance rolling stock - the `Networker'.  At the same time, 
the infrastructure was to be upgraded for instance by lengthening station 
platforms to take longer trains and by resignalling.  The result would be to raise 
both the capacity of individual trains and - because of the higher performance - the 
number of trains that could be run.  The first phase of this investment would 
involve introducing 400 `Networker' coaches, and cost a total of £700m (British 
Railways Board, 1991b, page 14). 
 
b. The passenger service to Kings Lynn 
 
Kings Lynn is situated around 100 miles north of London on the Norfolk coast; it is 
the main railhead for the Borough of Kings Lynn and West Norfolk, which has a 
population of some 130,000.  It represents the end point of a Network South East 
commuter line from London through Cambridge, but most of the commuter traffic 
is from closer to London.  Until the late 1980's, it was served by locomotive hauled 
main line trains at approximately two-hourly intervals.  But there were a number 
of problems with this pattern of service.  Firstly, because the bulk of the traffic was 
from further south, load factors over the northern part of the route were very poor 
(A.S. Fowkes and C.A. Nash, 1987).  Secondly facilities had to be retained for 
locomotives to run round their trains at Kings Lynn, adding to the cost.  Thirdly, 
the decision had already been taken to electrify the southern part of the line from 
Cambridge; taking advantage of this would require a change from electric to diesel 
traction or vice versa at Cambridge.  Fourthly, the diesel locomotives were 
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approaching 30 years old and were becoming unreliable and expensive to maintain. 
 
The range of options for this rather minor part of the London commuter network 
was astonishing.  Initially the local authority was very keen to see electrification 
through to Kings Lynn so that the existing pattern of service could continue, but 
using electric locomotives throughout.  However, this would have involved a 
continuation of existing low load factors.  One option, based on electric multiple 
units which could more readily be coupled and uncoupled en route so that only part 
of the train worked right through to Kings Lynn, seemed attractive; this might 
permit a doubling of services to hourly.  In either case, electrification would be 
accompanied by reducing the route from double to single track, although an 
additional passing loop would be required if the service were increased to hourly. 
 
If the route were not to be electrified, the existing service could continue, with 
replacement of the diesel locomotives in due course.  Or the diesel locomotives 
could be replaced by diesel multiple units, running either hourly or two hourly, and 
either running right through to London or connecting with electric trains at 
Cambridge; alternatively the section of line from Cambridge to Ely could be 
electrified and the connection made there.  In all some 17 options were identified.  
Ultimately, the decision was to electrify and provide an hourly electric multiple 
unit service, although this was only permitted by the agreement of the local 
authority concerned to contribute towards the costs. 
 
c. The Australian national rail investment programme 
 
In 1982, the Australian Railway Research and Development Organisation was 
commissioned to undertake a study to identify the level of investment in the 
national rail system that would be commercially justified over the coming 5 years 
(Norley and Kinnear, 1983).  The rail system remained a very important part of the 
Australian freight transport network at the time of the study, carrying some 
37,000m tonne kilometres of traffic, almost as much as road (Nash, 1985).  
Moreover this traffic had doubled in the preceding 15 years, largely as a result of a 
boom in coal and mineral exports.  In the passenger sector, however, rail had 
dwindled to insignificance except for suburban passenger services in the main 
cities. 
 
It might be thought that this boom in bulk freight haulage would have shielded 
Australian railways from the financial problems which had afflicted railways 
throughout the world.  Not so.  From a position in which they had covered working 
expenses from earnings up to the late 1960's, financial performance had declined 
until they only covered some 70% of working expenses.  This was due to the 
retention, required by government, not just of loss making passenger services but 
also of many loss making freight services carrying car loads or less than car loads 
of general merchandise.  At the same time, much of the operation was inefficient, 
and the assets elderly and of poor quality.  The main line network consisted of 
single track routes with passing loops, traditional semaphore signalling, low speed 
limits and severe weight and speed restrictions on many bridges. 
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The approach taken in this study was as follows.  First, the future demand for rail 
transport was forecast, allowing for likely shedding of unprofitable traffics.  A rail 
network model was utilised to turn this into an estimate of future capacity 
requirements from which expansion investment needed could be identified.  
Replacement investment requirements were analysed by examining the condition 
of existing rail assets and utilising the results of past studies on issues such as 
locomotive replacement.  The identification of revenue generating and cost-saving 
projects relied heavily on the proposals of the individual railways, although some 
issues (eg. centralised traffic control, electrification) were suitable for a more 
systematic analysis, in which breakeven volumes for the investment in question 
could be identified.  The network model was then run again to assess the costs of 
handling the appropriate demand matrix under each investment programme. 
 
It was decided to test four basic investment programmes.  Programme A would be a 
minimum programme to keep the main line rail system operating at its existing 
quality and capacity.  Programme B would be sufficient to enable all commercially 
viable traffic to be handled.  Programme C would contain the most profitable 
additional investment and programme D would contain the full range of projects 
believed to be viable at a 10% rate of discount. 
 
Why was it necessary to test investment programmes, rather than simply put 
together alternative packages of individually tested projects?  The answer is clearly 
that it was considered there were so many sources of interdependence between 
projects that we could not regard the return on a package as being simply the sum 
of the returns on individual projects. 
 
d. British Rail electrification plan 
 
In the late 1970's, the British Rail system was unusual by European standards in 
still relying heavily on diesel rather than electric traction for its main lines (only 
23% of its route system was electrified (British Railways Board 1979)).  At the 
time, BR was developing a strategy for long term rolling stock investment, and it 
appeared to them that main line electrification was a sensible long term option.  
Yet individual schemes for particular routes appeared very marginal by the 
standard of the required commercial rate of return, which was then 7%.  It seemed 
likely that an examination at the network level might find a stronger case for 
electrification of a whole network of lines than existed for any one line, since many 
routes would share common tracks and terminals and these would only have to be 
electrified once. 
 
The approach taken was to postulate four alternative levels of electrification; a 
base case, a modest programme concentrated on a couple of major routes; a 
medium level covering the key trunk routes and bringing the level of electrification 
up to 50% of the route system, and a large network including secondary routes 
forming extensions of these routes (British Railways Board, 1981).  Costs of 
operating the system were then estimated using forecast levels of traffic and 
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assuming that the existing set of services was retained.  The results indicated that 
the highest net present value was for the largest network, and that the internal 
rate of return was lowest for the smallest network - all the larger networks showed 
an internal rate of return of the order of 11%.  This supported the view that 
examining a network plan for electrification was more appropriate than looking at 
individual schemes in isolation. 
 
3. THE MOTIVATION FOR INVESTMENT IN RAIL TRANSPORT 
 
Having briefly described these case studies, we now seek to identify a number of 
issues that commonly arise in rail project appraisal.  Firstly, we consider the 
motives for investment.  Investment in rail transport may in principle be divided 
into the following categories. 
 
a. Replacement investment 
 
The main assets of the rail transport industry have long lives.  Railway rolling 
stock typically has a life of some 30 years; whilst track renewals may need to take 
place more frequently than that; structures have even longer lives.  Nevertheless, a 
very large part of rail investment takes the form of renewal of existing equipment.  
This may take place simply because as equipment ages it becomes more difficult 
and expensive to maintain.  But replacement investment almost always has an 
element of `betterment' as well, in as much as obsolescence occurs as designs that 
are more attractive to the consumer or more economical to the operator (or both) 
become available.  All the case studies considered have a strong element of 
replacement in them, but they all involve betterment too.  The need for 
replacement is the most common trigger of a rail investment decision. 
 
b.Expansion 
 
Whilst in aggregate on a world scale the tendency has been for rail demand to 
stagnate, this hides many traffics and areas which have seen rapid growth in rail 
demand, and a need for investment simply to cope with growth.  This was true of 
the `Networker' proposals in Kent and of the Australian national investment 
proposals, for example. 
 
c. Revenue gathering 
 
Investment may be undertaken in order to improve an existing service or to 
introduce a new one which is commercially attractive.  All of the above proposals 
were expected to generate increased income. 
 
d. Cost cutting 
 
Technical change or changes in the characteristics of demand may mean that a 
different form of equipment to that currently operated would be more economical, 
or it may just be that the historic pattern of service is inherently wasteful (as in the 
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case of the service to Kings Lynn). 
 
e. Social 
 
Investment may be desired to upgrade the service or introduce a new one not on 
commercial grounds but on social grounds, in terms of benefits to users, relief of 
road congestion, economic regeneration or environmental improvement.  This was 
a consideration in Kent, for instance, where existing targets for overcrowding were 
not being met. 
 
Having introduced these motivations, which obviously play a part in generating 
proposals for investment, it must immediately be said that almost any investment 
may serve several or all of these purposes.  As an example, consider again the 
proposals for the introduction of new `Networker' rolling stock on commuter 
services between London and Kent.  Fundamentally this is replacement rolling 
stock for ageing equipment which is expensive to maintain.  But it will also 
increase capacity to cope with growth of commuting in this part of the country.  
Improved performance and more attractive coaches will attract increased revenue, 
particularly in the off peak.  Technological developments will make it cheaper to 
operate.  And finally the set of services in question is subsidised in order to relieve 
congestion in London; a purely commercial operator would raise fares rather than 
expanding capacity in the face of growing demand. 
 
The above example immediately introduces some of the complexity of rail 
investment planning.  This will become more apparent when one tries to define the 
base case for any particular project appraisal. 
 
 
4. IDENTIFYING THE BASE CASE 
 
Much of the confusion surrounding the rates of return earned by rail investment 
arises because of the difficulties in defining the base case.  Essentially, the base 
case represents the best estimate of what will happen in the absence of the 
investment in question.  The problems are immediately apparent from the range of 
alternatives that could be taken. 
 
a.The service could be assumed to close.  But to the extent that it shares costs with 
other services (freight services operating over the same tracks; other 
passenger services sharing the same rolling stock, staff, terminals depots) 
the costs (and revenues) that will be avoided by this action clearly depend 
on what is assumed to happen to these services.  In any event, very few 
railways have the power to withdraw passenger services without reference 
to the political process; in the case of London commuter and other local 
services in Britain, there is a specific obligation placed on British Rail by 
the government to keep the service running at `broadly' its existing level.  
Thus whilst closure (with or without substitute buses) may be worth 
analysing as an option to consider, it will often not be feasible even if it is 
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commercially or even socially the most profitable course of action. 
 
b.Fares could be increased to commercial levels, reducing the need for capacity.  
Again this will usually depend on political decisions, and will not 
necessarily be a feasible option, although it should clearly be considered in 
the course of an appraisal. 
 
c.A cheaper `minimum renewals' option could be assumed.  In the past, much 
British Rail investment has been appraised against an assumption of 
minimal renewals.  The problem is that minimum renewals have often been 
taken to cost almost as much as the options under consideration, so that in 
this way the majority of investment escapes appraisal altogether. 
 
d.The service could continue to operate with the existing assets.  Rail assets rarely 
disappear in a cloud of rust; they usually can continue in service at a price.  
In the case of rolling stock, that usually means greater maintenance costs 
and reduced reliability; for infrastructure it typically means steadily more 
severe speed and weight restrictions.  If one considers indefinite 
postponement of renewals, then the appraiser may be involved in trying to 
estimate what would happen if assets were kept beyond the life of any 
previous experience.  Moreover, indefinite postponement of replacement is 
rarely a sensible option.  The much more important question, as in most 
appraisals, is usually whether to replace now or in say five or ten years 
time. 
 
Now all that the above discussion illustrates is that the choice of base is to a large 
extent arbitrary.  In any given appraisal it will be necessary to consider many if not 
all of the above options.  It follows that it is highly misleading to talk of a rail 
investment yielding a particular rate of return of x%, without making it clear with 
what it is being compared.  This has led to confusion whenever rates of return on 
rail investment are quoted without clearly explaining what the base case is with 
which the investment is being compared. 
 
 
5. IDENTIFYING THE OPTIONS 
 
In effect, then, we may already have a number of options in the form of alternative 
base cases before we start to consider the investment possibilities in question.  
These will cover a range of different types of equipment and different combinations 
of rolling stock and infrastructure.  For instance, in the particular example of Kent 
commuter services, the decision was to expand capacity by a combination of 
operating longer trains and higher performance stock to increase track capacity.  
Clearly, an alternative (although probably in this case a very costly one) would be 
to lay extra tracks; another alternative (difficult but not impossible within the 
restrictive British loading gauge) would be to use double-deck trains. 
 
The range of alternatives deserving attention in even a simple case can be quite 
  
 
 
 8 
large.  For instance, consider the example of the service to Kings Lynn, where no 
fewer than 17 serious options were identified.  In this case it would have been very 
easy to miss all the best options since they involved simultaneous changes in 
service specification, rolling stock and infrastructure. 
 
It is highly likely that the type of rolling stock used on a particular service will 
influence the service level operated, the fares charged and the infrastructure 
required.  Thus investment appraisal in rolling stock cannot be considered as a 
separate task from service planning as a whole.  It is also the case that often it is 
worth investing in new rolling stock for one route and transferring the rolling stock 
from that route to another route.  For instance, the proposed electrification 
programme for British Rail would have released modern high speed diesel trains 
which would have been redeployed to replace older locomotives and coaches 
elsewhere.  Sometimes quite complicated `cascades' of rolling stock can be planned 
before the oldest rolling stock emerges to be scrapped.  This used to be very much a 
feature of BR rolling stock investment in the 1970's, when investment was 
concentrated on the allocation of the most modern units to the most profitable inter 
city routes, and the rest of the system made do by shuffling around existing stock.  
In the 1980's however this has been perceived as an expensive solution involving 
the operation of a lot of stock on services for which it was not designed, and a 
greater degree of specialisation of rolling stock has been seen as appropriate. 
 
 
6. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INVESTMENTS 
 
Again the section on identification of options has already introduced this issue, 
inasmuch as rolling stock options interact with infrastructure options, and 
infrastructure options interact with other services using the route.  For instance, 
part of the case for the `Networker' investment in Kent is that it will release track 
capacity for new passenger and freight services between Britain and the continent 
via the Channel Tunnel. 
 
Interdependence formed a major issue in case studies c and d, the Australian 
national investment plan and the BR network electrification studies.  Again it is 
useful to categorise interdependence in a number of ways: 
 
a. Technical interdependence 
 
This is where one investment positively requires another investment.  For 
instance, investment in electrification is aborted if electric rolling stock is not also 
provided; locomotives and wagons which operate at heavier axle weights may 
require investment in new track and strengthening of bridges; more powerful 
locomotives may be pointless without lengthening loops to accommodate longer 
trains.  All these issues arose in the Australian study. 
 
b. Technical substitutes 
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Investments may be direct substitutes to the point where it is clearly nonsensical 
to undertake the two simultaneously; eg. electrification and the purchase of new 
diesel rolling stock for the same route. 
 
c. Economic complements 
 
One investment may improve the case for another one without requiring it.  For 
instance electrification of one route may require terminals and sections of track 
used by other services also to be electrified, thus reducing the cost of converting 
those routes as well.  Or the cost of electrification itself may be reduced by 
simultaneously remodelling the track layout to remove excess capacity; this will 
then require some resignalling and might make it sensible to renew the signalling 
simultaneously as well.  Of course this means again that the level of service on all 
services using the infrastructure should also be examined at the same time. 
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d. Economic substitutes 
 
One investment may reduce the case for another one.  The most obvious case of this 
is where parallel routes exist; upgrading one reduces the case for upgrading 
another.  Similarly, in the case of the Kent `Networker', by providing additional 
capacity on existing routes this investment reduces the case for increasing track 
capacity by constructing a new line between London and the Channel Tunnel. 
 
The implication of these interdependencies is clear.  Often investments interact in 
such a way that it will not be adequate to appraise them in isolation from each 
other.  As a consequence, packages of investments - or investment plans - will need 
to be considered as well as independent projects. 
 
 
7. VALUING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 
The costs and benefits of rail investment are not very different from those of 
investment in other sectors of the transport industry.  They may be grouped as 
follows (Nash and Preston, 1991): 
 
a. Cost savings to rail operators 
b. Increased revenue to rail operators 
c. Reduced generalised cost of travel to users 
d. Reduced congestion on roads 
e. Reduced environmental impact of roads 
f. Economic development benefits. 
 
Obviously for a purely commercial investment it is only the first two items that are 
relevant, and the question then becomes one of how far the remaining items can be 
converted into revenue (this is also true in Britain in the case of investments which 
qualify for Central government grant aid under Section 56 of the 1968 Transport 
Act, where reduced generalised cost to users is not allowed as part of the case for 
subsidy).  The scope for doing this is rather limited by the relatively high price 
elasticities of demand for rail transport, particularly for leisure travel (Owen and 
Phillips, 1987).  It has often been postulated that an improvement in the quality of 
rail services should reduce the price elasticity of demand and make pricing up more 
attractive but there seems to be little firm evidence on this.  What is clear is that, 
where prices are subject to a degree of political control (as in the London commuter 
network), improved quality of service can make pricing up more politically 
acceptable.  Whether the extra revenue from a price increase that would have been 
commercially worthwhile even without the investment should be credited to that 
investment seems doubtful. 
 
The most obvious item of reduced generalised cost to users from a rail investment 
is that of time savings, and here the same techniques of valuation may be applied 
as in other parts of the transport sector (MVA et al, 1987).  However, other more 
qualitative elements of generalised cost may be more important for rail transport 
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than for some other modes.  For instance in the case of commuter services it is 
often the degree of overcrowding and unreliability that leads to complaint rather 
than mean journey times.  Valuations for these items have been estimated by using 
stated preference techniques in much the same way as in the study which derived 
the current Department of Transport values of time (Fowkes and Nash, 1991).  
These pose questions as to which would be preferred out of hypothetical choices 
between different combinations of fare, journey time and degree of overcrowding or 
unreliability, and yield results in the form of differential values of time, for 
instance for travel in a crowded train or standing, and for unscheduled delay as 
opposed to scheduled travel time. 
 
The principal issue that arises in estimating the effect on road users and the 
environment of rail investment is that of the degree to which extra rail traffic has 
actually diverted from road.  Examination of a number of urban rail investments 
suggested that this may typically be 25% or less (Nash, 1991), although this may 
understate the long term effects; rail investment may influence not just the choice 
of travel mode for existing workers but also the home and workplace locations of 
those newly locating.  This must be the explanation for the very large increases in 
commuter traffic recorded following electrification of many London commuter 
routes.  Similar conclusions arise from studies of the impact of new high speed rail 
services, where some 50% of traffic was generated rather than diverted (Bonnafous, 
1987) and the potential for diverting freight from road to rail also appears 
relatively small except in particular markets (bulk commodities, and general 
merchandise travelling long distances (Fowkes, Nash and Tweddle, 1991). 
 
What this seems to imply is that even though there is evidence that the volume of 
rail traffic can be significantly influenced by providing more attractive fares and 
service level packages, this course of action will only make a modest contribution to 
solving the problems of road and air traffic growth.  If we do take the congestion 
and environmental problems posed by the transport sector seriously, then we have 
to discourage the growth of car and air traffic more directly.  The sort of measures 
which might be considered are higher prices (especially for motoring in cities and 
for air travel), widespread traffic calming and parking controls.  These measures 
all sound very negative.  But if they are seen in that way, there is a danger that all 
that will happen is the further decentralisation of the population away from cities 
into smaller towns where the use of the car is not so restricted.  If cities are to be 
places where people actually want to live and work, then we need to create 
developments in which the attractive environment these controls bring will make 
them welcome.  Such cities would encourage the use of walking and cycling for 
shorter journeys, and of bus and train for longer journeys.  In other words the role 
of rail in an integrated transport policy may be much greater than the evidence of 
diversion from isolated investments implies. 
 
Economic development benefits also are increasingly seen as a motivation for rail 
investment, either by encouraging jobs to locate in a particular urban centre (eg. in 
Docklands) or by opening up new journey to work opportunities for residential 
areas (eg. many proposed reopenings of local rail services, such as Leicester-Burton 
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or Nottingham-Mansfield, have been designed to make access to jobs in the city 
accessible to people from areas of high unemployment).  The principles of economic 
evaluation in such cases are well known; the economic benefits of such effects 
represent the additional surpluses earned by employers, government or workers 
over and above what would have been earned in the absence of the investment.  
The problem is again one of forecasting - not just how many jobs will be attracted 
or how many residents in the area will find jobs, although that is hard enough, but 
also how far the jobs would otherwise simply have located elsewhere, or the jobs 
have been filled by other people.  In other words it is any net increase in 
employment and incomes brought about by the scheme that is important, not the 
gross income. 
 
Such evidence as exists suggest that, in a developed country such as Britain, 
economic development benefits of transport infrastructure tends to be very limited 
(Parkinson, 1981).  Yet the issue remains politically enormously influential.  For 
instance it is argued that investment in the commuter rail network in London is 
essential to maintain London's position as a centre of European finance and 
banking; that good links to the regions from the Channel Tunnel are important to 
their economic prospects and so on. 
 
What this section suggests is that a narrow approach to the benefits of rail 
investment will be inappropriate.  Rail investment has to be seen as part of the 
overall transport system of a city or region, and plans for rail investment 
integrated with land-use and economic development plans.  In many countries this 
takes place to a far greater extent than in Britain (SDG, 1992). 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have seen in this paper many of the difficulties that surround project appraisal 
in the rail sector.  To a large extent these are not technical problems of forecasting 
and valuing the effects of rail schemes, although uncertainties do remain there, 
especially regarding the broader economic impact of rail investment.  The biggest 
problems concern the context within which the appraisal is undertaken.  We have 
encountered problems regarding definition of the base case, regarding definition of 
the potentially large number of options to be examined, regarding the interaction 
between individual rail projects and regarding the effects on the appraisal of 
assumptions about future price and service levels both for the services directly 
affected by the investment and those other services within which these interact. 
 
What seems clear from this is that, even for a commercial railway, project 
appraisal cannot be seen as a separate activity isolated from the general business 
planning of the organisation.  Sensible project appraisal requires a clear vision of 
the objectives of the company, and of the future mix of services, fares and quality to 
which it aspires. 
 
When social considerations are also brought into the picture the situation becomes 
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even more complicated.  Rail investment decisions then become intertwined with 
decisions on other modes of transport, on land use planning and on planning for 
economic development.  Almost always this will involve a number of agencies other 
than the railway itself.  Without a sensible institutional framework within which 
planning can take place, rail project appraisal is inevitably to a large extent based 
on guesswork as to what the other agencies involved will do. 
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